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On January 4, 2004, four Thai soldiers were killed when approximately 30 armed 
bandits stormed the army depot in Narathiwat, 750 miles south of Bangkok, stealing a 
cache of 300 weapons. At the same time, 18 schools in the same area were set on fire in 
an effort to distract the attention of government officials away from the attack. Based on 
credible information, The Royal Thai Government has blamed Muslim separatists for the 
attacks. Previously, In the mid 1980s, the Muslim separatist problem was eliminated in 
southern Thailand when the government took a two-fold approach: first, to empower the 
military to oversee both the police and civil-service sectors; and later, based on 
recommendations from the military, to initiate new social and economic policies. This 
thesis examines, through both an anthropological analysis of the conflict and a theory of 
counterinsurgency, the re-emergence of the Muslim separatist groups in southern 
Thailand and provides both short and long term solutions for the Royal Thai government. 
It offers a background analysis of the historical relationship between the Thai government 
and Thai Muslims in order to highlight why the former separatist problem occurred in 
Thailand. Next, the current separatist problem is examined to determine why this issue 
has reoccurred and possible reasons for the government’s underestimation of the 
situation.  This thesis then addresses measures the Thai government may take to preclude 
a future Muslim separatist insurgency, and offers both an analysis of former measures 
that were successful and an appraisal of the current conditions conducive to an 
insurgency. Finally, the conditions necessary for a successful resolution of the Muslim 
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In Thailand, Muslims are the largest religious minority, with the majority of 
Muslims living in the southernmost provinces near the Malaysian border. Most Thai 
Muslims live in peace with Thai Buddhists, but some Muslim groups within the south 
seek to separate from Thailand and establish an Islamic state. Initially Muslim separatist 
activity reached its peak in the 1970s and 1980s, and the government successfully 
defused the secessionist movement by granting greater religious freedom, enacting tough 
security measures, improving communications, and undertaking development measures. 
Interaction with the neighboring countries, especially Malaysia, which was providing 
refuge for some separatists, also helped the resolution process. By the mid 1980s, the 
government succeeded in eliminating the Muslim separatist problem and bringing peace 
to the region. 
However, the increase in Islamic insurgency felt around the world following 
September 11th fuelled an upsurge in Southeast Asia that also affected Thailand.  Militant 
Muslims in the south have cited the historical background of their region and their 
religious differences as the basis for their claims before the international community, 
including the Muslim world.  In addition, however, Muslim separatist groups have used 
the tactics of terrorism in their fight against perceived symbols of oppression.  The targets 
of this renewed violence have traditionally been Thai government officials and symbols 
of Bangkok’s Thai Buddhist government. In fact, since January 2004, violence and 
killings have occurred on nearly a daily basis in southern Thailand, with currently over 
400 people killed as the result of arson attacks, bombings, and assassinations.  Yet it is 
the nature of the violence in 2004 that has changed.  Efforts to incite violence have 
shifted to urban areas, targeting civilians, Buddhist monks, tourists, and others not 
associated with the government and security forces.  As a consequence, it is now 
increasingly more difficult for the government to identify those who are behind the 
violence. 
This thesis examines, through both an anthropological analysis of the conflict and 
a theory of counterinsurgency, the re-emergence of the Muslim separatist groups and 
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provides short term and long term solutions for the Royal Thai government. It offers 
background about the historical relationship between the government and Thai Muslims 
in order to highlight why the former Muslim separatist problem occurred in Thailand. 
Next, the Muslim separatist problem is examined to determine why this problem is 
occurring again and determines reasons for the Thai government’s underestimation of the 
situation.  This thesis then addresses measures the Thai government may take to preclude 
a future Muslim separatist insurgency, including an analysis of those measures that were 
successful in the past and an assessment of which conditions conducive to an insurgency 
currently exist in Thailand. Finally, the conditions necessary for a successful future 
Muslim separatist problem in Thailand are delineated in short term and long term 
solutions. 
The information used to support this thesis research was derived from multiple 
sources.  In addition to open source research, a great deal of information was derived 
from official government and academic documents provided by various Thai institutions. 
Some of the most insightful information, however, came from September 2004 
interviews conducted in Thailand with media representatives, Royal Thai Army officials, 
and academic professionals from Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok.  
 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
South Thailand historically has been a peripheral region contested between the 
Kingdom of Thailand in the north and various states and empires in the south. 
The Thai Kingdom of Sukhothai briefly extended the area under its control 
southward to Pattani in the 13th century. Apparently, during part of the 14th century, the 
Kingdom of Pattani included not only the Thai provinces of Satun, Yala, Naratiwat, and 
Pattani, but additional territory to the north as well; thus the kingdom ranked high in 
importance among the Malay states. After 1350, the Thais conquered most of the Malay 
Peninsula. However, the rise of the Malay state of Malacca in the 15th century resulted in 
the receding of Thai power, and by 1460 the Pattani States were dependencies of 
Malacca.  At this same time Malays from Malacca settled in the Pattani region, displacing 
the local natives, and also bringing with them Muslim missionaries who converted the 
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local population. Pattani’s preeminence as a center for Muslim scholarship dates from 
this period, a distinction which characterizes it to this day (Fraser, 1960). The subsequent 
Islamization of Pattani replaced many elements of the Hindu-Buddhist culture, and the 
Muslim religious elite came to dominate the Kingdom’s sociopolitical system. 
By 1511 the Siam Kingdom (Thailand) had regained control of Pattani and signed 
a treaty with the Portuguese, giving the latter exclusive rights to the lucrative Chinese and 
Japanese trade conducted at the port of Pattani (Thompson, 1941). 
The 16th and early 17th centuries witnessed the continued importance of the town 
of Pattani as a prominent European trading center. However, Pattani’s commercial stature 
quickly declined after 1622 when both the British and the Dutch abandoned their 
factories there to promote their competing trading interests elsewhere in Southeast Asia 
(Fraser, 1966). Hostility between the Thai Kingdom and Pattani occurred in 1636 initially 
over the refusal of the Pattani queen to pay the annual tribute to the Thai king during the 
reign of the Thai Kingdom of Ayutthaya. Subsequent rebellions against the Thais 
occurred in 1786 and 1832. This latter revolt resulted in the devastation of Pattani by 
Thai military forces and completed Pattani’s demise as a regional power (Fraser, 1960). 
Until 1901, when the Thai king established a central administration under the 
Thai Ministry of the Interior, the Kingdom of Pattani, which incorporated most of 
present-day Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat Provinces, possessed a large degree of 
autonomy, even in external affairs, as a vassal state under the Thai kings (Fraser, 1960).  
In 1909, the British takeover of the four northern Malay states of Kelantan, Trengganu, 
Kedah, and Palis encouraged further Thai centralization, with taxation, education and, 
eventually, language being brought under varying degrees of Thai control. Although 
these moves stirred Malay-Muslim irredentist aspirations, it was not until the turbulent 
years of the early 1930s that they were fully awoken. Following the military’s overthrow 
of the Thai monarchy in 1932, a modified concept of popular sovereignty emerged which 
increasingly came to define citizenship not so much in terms of political obedience but on 
the basis of national unity. Stressing evermore state centralization and the need to rapidly 
assimilate outlying ethnic groups, the new integrationist push was to have a decisive 
impact on the local administrative sector in Pattani (Christie, 1996; Forbs, 1989; Leifer, 
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1996; Pitsuwan, 1985; Stockwell, 1979). For example, the old local government 
structure, which had allowed some autonomous Malay political representation, was 
replaced by a simpler and more centralized system, and the three provinces of the Pattani 
region (Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat) were placed under the direct control of the 
Ministry of the Interior of the Thai government. 
During the 1930s, the Thai military regime of Pibul Songkhram initiated a series 
of policies aimed at the forcible assimilation of Muslims. The wearing of western-style 
trousers was made compulsory for men, and Muslims were prevented from adopting 
Muslim names or using the Malay dialect. In addition, shari’ah law (Islamic law) was set 
aside in favor of the Thai Buddhist laws of marriage and inheritance (Forbes, 1982). 
These policies generated a great deal of resentment among the Muslim population of 
Thailand.  
By the end of World War II, the government tried to adopt a more conciliatory 
stance towards Muslims in the South. But centuries of marginalization and suppression at 
the hands of Thai officials, state intrusions into Muslim civil society, and the absence of 
Pattanese political participation contributed to mutual antagonism between both sides. 
This antagonism erupted on April 28, 1948, in a pivotal event known as the Dusun Nyiur 
incident- a violent clash between Thai police and Pattanese Muslims that left an 
estimated 1,100 Muslims and 30 policemen killed and set the stage for the rise of more 
militant Muslim separatist groups (Islam, 1982). In 1959, the first Muslim separatist 
group, BNPP (Barisan National Pember-Basan Pattani), was founded by Tuanku Abdul 
Kade, an heir to the ruling chieftain of Pattani Township, who lost influence over the 
town when King Rama V issued a royal decree to abolish all positions of the ruling 
chieftains of all towns in the southern border provinces, and armed resistance did not 
begin until 1960 when Field Marshall Sarit Thannarat ruled Thailand (Primer: Muslim 
Separatism in Southern Thailand, 2002).   
The Muslim separatist groups reached their peak in the 1970s and 1980s, and in 
the mid 1970s the Thai government successfully defused the secessionist movements 
through enlightened policies that emphasized political over purely military solutions and 
included, among other actions, granting greater religious freedom, and development of 
 5
the area combined with a psychological campaign. However, by the late 1990s, poverty, 
crime, and corruption among Thai officials posted in the south helped revive the 
separatist movement, and some isolated incidents occurred, including the killing of police 
at checkpoints in Yala and Narathiwat provinces in 2000 and 2001. These incidents were 
incorrectly handled by the Thai government which transferred all responsibility for 
security in the region from the Royal Thai Army’s 4th Army Region to the Thai police, 
because the government perceived the incidents as acts of common banditry. However, 
after September 11th, 2001, and Thailand’s support to the US War On Terror, the number 
of terrorist incidents has risen. The increased movement of Muslim separatist groups was 
confirmed on 4 January, 2004, when an Army depot in Narathiwat Province was raided 
by more than 30 armed insurgents, resulting in the death of four Thai soldiers. After this 
incident, the Thai government began to rethink the problem of renewed Muslim 
separatism in the south. 
 
B. MUSLIMS IN THAILAND  
 
Figure 1.   Majority Muslim provinces in Southern Thailand   
(From Gearing, 2001) 
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In Thailand, Thai Muslims are the largest minority group.  They make up 
approximately 6 million people, or 4% of the total population which is predominantly 
Buddhist. Four-fifths of Muslims are concentrated in the Provinces of Satun, Pattani, 
Narathiwat and Yala at the southern end of Thailand. Most of these provinces were part 
of the old Sultanate of Pattani, a previously autonomous region, annexed by Thailand in 
1902. The majority of Thai Muslims are ethnic Malay and actually call themselves “Thai 
Malays,” with Thai, Chinese and Pakistani Muslims constituting the remainder of the 
southern inhabitants. The location of the Muslim populations in the south is further 
divided by these ethnic sub-groups. For example, ethnic Malays live in the coastal and 
the rural areas, ethnic Pakistanis immigrants live in the urban centers, ethnic Thai live in 
the rural areas of the central region, and Chinese Muslims live in the far north. The 
majority of the Muslims in Thailand are Sunnis, and the remainders are Shiite.  Ethnic 
Malays, which are the second largest minority group in Thailand, have had the greatest 
influence of all Thai Muslims because geographical factors and cultural affinities of 
Islam have promoted a strong Malay identification with neighboring Malaysia, and the 
Thai government has granted a number of cultural, linguistic, and religious concessions 
(Department of the Army, 1970). In geographical terms, Fraser (1960) mentions that 
Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat Provinces, which are separated from Songkhla Province by 
an uninhabited jungle that extends as much as 50 miles, and the greater geographical 
accessibility between Narathiwat and the bordering Malay state of Kelantan, foster easier 
contact with Malaysia than Thailand. The people in these four provinces speak two 
languages: Thai and Jawi. Roux (1998) mentions, that Jawi is a Malay dialect which 
reflects the language of the sultanate of Pattani. The Pattani dialect is similar in 
vocabulary, morphology, and phonology to that of the bordering Malay state of Kelantan. 
Some Malays of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat are not interested in the national Thai 
language of Thailand because they think that this language is the language of Buddhism.  
The economic activities of Thai Muslims are divided between fishing in the 
coastal regions and agricultural work on the rice and rubber plantations in the hinterland. 
Fishing in the South China Sea and the Gulf of Thailand is the primary occupation, and 
the season operates from December until the end of March. At the close of the fishing 
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season, working the coconut lands near the coastal areas becomes the predominate 
activity, followed by working rubber plantations (Fraser, 1966).  
The education of a Muslim child in the south is provided in two forms. First, the 
child receives a formal education from the Thai government in primary and secondary 
school. Second, he or she receives an informal education about the Muslim religion from 
local Malay religious leaders.  
Education in the Thai school system is free and compulsory for a period of seven 
years. The Ministry of Education in Bangkok determines educational policies and the 
school curriculum, although the implementation of various guidelines is in the hands of 
Thai provincial and district officials. Primary schools are available in most of the Malay 
coastal villages, but are less frequent in the more sparsely settled interior regions of South 
Thailand. Secondary schools have been established for the most part only in the larger 
towns (Fraser, 1960). 
Each child’s religious instruction commences at the age of six or seven and takes 
place in a Pondok, a family-run Islamic school, which offers a traditional religious 
education (Suhrke, 1977). Religious instruction is conducted early in the morning 
between seven and nine, and is resumed from three to five in the afternoon after the 
children are released from the local school. The focus of this religious teaching is the 
learning of the entire Koran. The teaching method usually consists of the reading of a 
passage by the Iman, an Islamic priest, which is then followed by a recitation of the 
passage by the children. At the end of 1½ or two years of religious instruction, the child 
is examined on his knowledge of the Koran. If he succeeds in passing this test, he has 
completed the required minimum religious education (Fraser, 1960).  Because of the 
focus of the religious school system, young Muslims are not always provided a strong 
preparation for successful employment in the wider Thai society, and therefore they often 
attend traditional Islamic schools in Muslim countries in order to continue studying at the 
university level.  
Thai Muslims fall under the Thai political system and the jurisdiction of the Thai 
government by virtue of their Thai citizenship. Within the hierarchy of the Thai political 
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structure, authority originates with the Thai central government, passes through the 
province or Changwat level to the district or Amphur level, and finally is received at the 
Tambon, which is the next smallest administrative unit below the district level. In 
addition, within the Tambon, there are subunits called Muban, meaning “village.”  
Officials working at the province and district level are selected by the central 
government, but the head of the Muban or villages are selected by the villagers and are 
approved by Thai district officers (Fraser, 1966). Many of the Thai Buddhists sent to 
administer the southern border provinces are unenthusiastic about being posted to an 
alien society so far from Bangkok, and their dissatisfaction sometimes contributes to the 
heightened tension (McCargo, 2004). Because of their dissatisfaction, these officials may 
mistreat the Muslims, and, consequently, many Muslim villagers have chosen to cut off 
all contact with Thai officials, especially the Thai Police. In the past, the Muslims used 
parliamentary means to express their resentment, but these efforts proved ineffective, so 
some have now shifted from reliance on legal parliamentary means to a growing 
tendency towards violence (Pitsuwan, 1987).This violence began with the establishment 
of new Muslim separatist organizations.   
In Thailand, the south generally has a reputation for lawlessness and banditry 
including “common banditry; sea piracy, theft and robbery by small gangs; and large-
scale crimes committed by more than ten (and sometimes over a hundred) gang members 
(Thomas, 1975). This behavior has emerged from the uncertain nature of the life of 
southern Muslims.  McCargo (2004) argues that “ a man’s life in the South was more 
raw, closer to the edge; surviving could require a robust masculinity, a readiness to fight, 
to defend oneself, and if necessary even to steal from others” (p. 10).  Because of this 
tendency toward lawlessness, it is difficult to distinguish between the normal banditry 
and political violence. 
Although the life of the Muslims in the south of Thailand is better than in the past, 
resentment still exists in the region because of the different political administrations, 
some of which have not paid attention to the problems of Thai Muslim life. Because of 
this, a sense of social discrimination still exists in the minds of Thai Muslims. 
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C. MUSLIM SEPARATISM IN THAILAND 
Muslim separatist groups in the south of Thailand were established in 1960 during 
the rule of Field Marshall Satit Thannarat. Under his instruction, Islamic schools 
(Pondok) were brought under the control of the Minister of the Interior. Pondok that were 
openly critical of the regime were closed down. Protesters loyal to the Pondok fled to the 
jungle, and later organized Muslim separatist groups. They have been motivated by 
different ideological perspectives, but all have been motivated by the common desire to 
carve out an independent Muslim state with Pattani as the center (Isaacson & Rubenstein, 
2002). Militant separatist movements have operated in the region by using violent action 
in pursuit their objectives. Guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics such as ambushes, 
assassinations, kidnapping, extortion, sabotage, and bomb attacks have been used to 
undermine the Thai government. The main targets of violent actions have been the 
symbols of the Thai state that are considered to pose the greatest threat to Malay-Muslim 
culture and identity. These targets have included, most particularly, schools, teachers, 
local government officials and administrators, and Buddhist settlers (Christie, 1996).  
Despite the Thai government’s success in eliminating separatist threats in the mid 1980s, 
a renewed militant Islamic threat has emerged since the September 11th terrorist attacks in 
the US along with the Thai government’s support for the US War on Terror.  
Today, the Muslim separatist organizations in southern Thailand have changed.  
The splinter groups have united, mainly for purposes of resource acquisition, 
procurement of external support from international radical Muslim organizations, and the 
development of a more diverse support constituency in the south under the banner name 
of Bersatu (see Figure 2).   The exact number of Muslim insurgents, and whether or not 
they are involved simultaneously with several separatist groups, is unknown.  Generally, 
support for each of the following groups is draws from the southern provinces of 
Thailand and the adjacent provinces of Malaysia.  However, international support is 
drawn from Muslim communities around the world, with primary resources originating in 




Figure 2.   Militant Islamic Organizational Structure Today  
(From Inside the Muslim Separatist Problem in the South, 2004, p.60). 
 
The US Pacific Command’s Virtual Information Center (VIC) in Hawaii has 
provided the majority of the information below regarding the various militant splinter 
groups that exist in southern Thailand today.  Except for information specifically cited 
from other sources, the VIC is the primary source of data on these groups.   
 
1. The Barisan National Pember-Basan Pattani (BNPP)  
This organization was founded in 1947 by the former sultan’s family. The BNPP 
aims to establish an independent and sovereign Islamic state of Pattani through a multi-
pronged effort in the political, psychological, diplomatic, and military spheres (Isaacson 
& Rubenstein, 2002).  It is the oldest Muslim separatist organization in Thailand. The 
organization was created when the Malayan political group KUMPRA and a terrorist 
group led by Tenggu Yala Machae combined.  The first leader of the BNPP was Tanggu 
Mamud Mahi Yiddin (Intranon, 2003). 
By 1990, the name of the movement was changed to the BIPP to conform to the 
struggle launched by separatist Muslims throughout the world. The organization ceased 
its activity in Thailand until 2002. It is believed to have been involved in some attacks 
during the most recent spate of violence. BNPP members also participated in the 2002 
meeting of the eight Thai Muslim separatist groups held in Northern Malaysia. The 
BERSATU
   B.R.N. 
B.R.N. Congress 
        (Politic) 
         PULO 
  (Operate in Jungle)
B.R.N. Coordinate
       (Military) 
   BIPP 
(Foreign affair) 
GMIP 
     (Operate in Urban) 
B.R.N. ULAMA 
   (Religious) 
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BNPP is headquartered in northern Malaysia and participates in Malaysian state level 
politics (Primer: Muslim Separatism in Southern Thailand, 2002). 
 
2. The Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) 
The BRN was found on 13 March 1960 by two progressive core leaders.  Due to a 
conflict of interest and ideological differences, the front later split into three factions. The 
first one, the BRN Coordinate, has not been active in Thailand recently. However, the 
group is reportedly carrying out political activity in Malaysia. The second faction is the 
BRN Congress chaired by Rosa Burako. This faction has mainly been conducting 
military affairs. The third faction is the BRN Uram. It was previously headed by the late 
Hajji Abdul Karim. This faction has emphasized political and religious work. Among the 
three factions, the BRN Congress headed by Rosa Burako is regarded as the most active 
group. It has consolidated all of the armed units of the front, and this faction is militarily 
active, carrying out political and military activities consistently in the south border 
provinces. The BRN Congress’ main headquarters are located in Malaysia (Primer: 
Muslim Separatism in Southern Thailand, 2002). 
The ideology of the BRN, opposed to the Barisan Nasional Pember-Basan Pattani 
(BNPP), retains strong ties to the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM). The BRN 
harbored avowedly pan-Malay religious-nationalist aspirations which were essentially 
based on three main principles: Anti-colonialism and anti-capitalism; Islamic socialism 
aimed at the promotion of a just and prosperous society sanctioned by God; and Malay 
nationalism defined in terms of the oneness of God and humanitarianism (Isaacson & 
Rubenstein, 2002). 
 
3. The Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) 
This group is synonymous with the Thai separatist terrorist movement and is the 
largest and most active. However, at its peak it possessed no more than 300 “soldiers”. 
PULO was set up on 22 March 1968 by Tuanku Biyo Kodoniyo, who has been serving as 
its chairman ever since. The objective of this organization is to separate the five southern 
provinces of Yala, Songkhla, Pattani, Narathiwatm, and Satun from Thailand in order to 
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establish an independent Muslim Malay state or sultanate. During the late 1960s and 
throughout the 1970s, the PULO conducted minor attacks on Thai political symbols in 
the southern region. In 1980 the PULO began to conduct serious operations. For example, 
PULO operatives carried out four bomb attacks in Bangkok resulting in 47 people being 
injured. By late 1992, the organization had split into two factions. The first faction was 
headed by Dr. A-rong Muleng, while the second one was led by Hayihadi Mindosali. The 
first faction set up the PULO Leadership Council with a dagger crossing a sword as its 
logo. The name of its armed unit is called the “Caddan Army”. The second faction, also 
headed by Hajji Sama-ae Thanam, has set up the PULO Army Command Council or 
MPTP (expansion unknown) to give support to Tuanku Abdul Kade, the founder of the 
terrorist movement. The logo of the movement is an eagle, and the name of its army is 
Abudaban (“Pattani United Liberation Organisation [sic],” 2002). 
In 1995, rifts emerged among the core leader of the new PULO movement. As a 
result, Dr. A-rong Muleng decided to separate his group from the movement and set up a 
new organization called “PULO 88” or the Abu Jihad PULO, while the other group, led 
by Hajji Habeng Abdul Rohman, named its armed unit the “Caddan Army”. In the 
meantime, the old PULO still retains its status quo with Tuanku Biyo Kodoniyo as its 
leader. After some leaders of both the old and new PULO movements were arrested in 
early 1998, confusion immediately occurred with this organization. As a result, morale 
sank and some members, who lost faith in the group, gave themselves up to the Thai 
government. However, the two factions have tried to patch up their differences and to 
strengthen mutual cooperation. At present, it is reported that the two factions have 
dispatched their armed units to carry out joint military and political operations in some 
areas of the three southern border provinces. Command headquarters of the two factions 
are located in Malaysia (Primer: Muslim Separatism in Southern Thailand, 2002). 
 
4. The Mujahideen Pattani Movement (BNP) 
This front was established in 1985 with the goal of carrying out the struggle to 
liberate the southern border provinces. Front elements were commonly known as 
Mujahideen Pattani members. The front’s goal was to consolidate the many resistance 
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organizations into a single entity. It has placed an emphasis on conducting personnel 
training and political work. Its main headquarters is located in Malaysia. Most of their 
core leaders are elements that have split from the BIPP. However, the front’s 
performance has not been particularly successful. Its current political activity is confined 
to Malaysia only (Primer: Muslim Separatism in Southern Thailand, 2002). 
 
5. The United Front for the Independence of Pattani (Bersatu) 
The United Front for Independence of Pattani or “Bersatu” was formed with the 
aspiration of unifying all splinter terrorist groups together. On 31 August 1989, core 
leaders of all terrorist movement groups, namely the BIPP, the BRN Congress, the BNP, 
and the new PULO, held a joint meeting called “the gathering of the fighters for Pattani”. 
The members at this meeting agreed to set up the “Payong Organization” to unify all the 
movements and to carry the struggle in a unified direction in order to avoid confusion in 
soliciting and accepting financial donations from foreign countries. In 1991, the name of 
the organization was changed to “The United Front for the Independence of Pattani” or 
“Bersatu” as it is called today. These groups have employed the tactic of deploying small 
armed bands to carry out guerrilla activities in the jungles. They set up no permanent 
bases on Thai soil. Instead, they are on the move all the time and avoid engaging in 
armed clashes with Thai government authorities. If a brief clash should occur, the 
terrorists see to it that they withdraw from the scene of the fighting immediately. Fighting 
must not be protracted. If an opportunity arises, they will resort to an ambush tactic or 
launch a surprise attack on government authorities and positions. They choose to retaliate 
against government suppression drives by conducting sabotage activities against public 
facilities in town or on the plain. The terrorists have carried out both political and military 
activities. They have conducted propaganda campaigns by distorting facts to mobilize 
and convince the masses, especially Thai Muslims in the southern border provinces and 
in foreign countries, that the Thai Government oppresses the Muslim population. 
Additionally, they aspire to internationalize the issue and secure foreign intervention. 
They have set up conditions and demands that are unacceptable to and cannot be met by 
the government. They have tried to seek funds and assistance from other Islamic 
countries and have sought funds through extortion in order to carry out the struggle. They 
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have tried to disrupt the government’s education program by attacking schools; harming 
and threatening the life and property of school teachers; coercing parents to stop sending 
their children to Thai schools; terrorizing and harming those who cooperate with the 
government authorities; and creating influence by harming state authorities, planting 
bombs at public premises, and committing arson against public buildings (Primer: 
Muslim Separatism in Southern Thailand, 2002). 
 
6. The New Pattani United Liberation Organization (New PULO) 
New PULO emerged as a dissident faction of the original PULO in 1995. 
Established by Ar-rong Moo-reng and Hayi Abdul Rohman Bazo (who, up until 1998, 
acted as the Chairman of New PULO’s political/Kasdan wing), the groups has pursued 
the goal of Pattani self-autonomy through less dramatic but more consistent actions than 
its parent organization. To this end, the focus has been on carrying out minor attacks, 
such as small-scale bomb, incendiary, and shooting attacks that are intended to 
constantly harass and pester police, local authorities, and other symbols of Thai socio-
political suppression, particularly schools.  In common with PULO, it is alleged that the 
group’s ability to carry out these assaults has been considerably availed by passive 
Malaysian support, not the least because its leaders are believed to have had the benefit 
of operating out of secure safe havens in the Malaysian jungles of the Kalantan state. 
Following improved border relations between Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur since 1998, a 
number of New PULO’s leading figures have already been arrested in a series of 
combined Thai-Malaysian operations, including Haji Da-ho Thanam, the group’s 
military leader, and Rohman Bazo, the group’s chairman (Isaacson & Rubenstein, 
2002). 
 
7. Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP- Pattani Islamic 
 Mujahideen Movement) 
Unlike other separatist organizations in southern Thailand, the GMIP has been 
influenced by members educated in the Middle East. The GMIP has been the faction 
most influenced by events in Afghanistan and by the spread of radial Islam. During the 
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1980s and 1990s, thousands of Muslim volunteers traveled to Pakistan and Afghanistan 
to study Islam and receive military training. A small numbers of Thai nationals returned 
after studying in Madrassas in Pakistan and at other locations in the Middle East in 
2001/2002. During 2002, the GMIP, along with the BRN, was identified in a leaflet 
distributed in parts of southern Thailand as offering cash rewards for the murder of police 
officers. The leaflets were found in the Ra-ngae district and promised 100,000 Baht (US 
$2,440) for the death of each policeman. With respect to this organization, Thai 
authorities remain extremely concerned that the GMIP could provide Al-Qaeda with help 
similar to that provided to the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the Philippines. In August 
2002, Malaysian security forces arrested three people from a list of twenty most wanted 
separatists from a prestigious hotel in Kuala Lumpur often used by the GMIP as a 
meeting place, but the GMIP’s chief of operations, Naseh Saning, who was also in the 
hotel, managed to escape. Now, suspicions remain that the group is linked with Al-Qaeda 
and other Southeast Asian radical Islamist groups to include the Abu Syyaf Group (ASG) 
in the Philippines, Laskar Jihad in Indonesia, and Jemaah Islamiya (JI). Since Wae Ka 
Raeh, a GMIP member who underwent training at Al-Qaeda facilities, it seems likely that 
the GMIP has had some contact with Al-Qaeda and its allied groups (“Gerakan 
Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP-Pattani Islamic Mujahideen Movement,” 2002). 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
Today, the exact organization and structure of the militant groups in the south is 
not known.  When incidents involving violence occur, it is difficult for Thai authorities to 
know exactly which group is responsible for the incidents.  The time required for Thai 
authorities to investigate and analyze the incidents that occur is problematic in 
determining actual responsibility.  Additionally, a large number of the members of these 
organizations have dual nationalities, Thai and Malaysian.  This fact has made it difficult 
for Thai authorities to not only pursue suspected militants, but also to investigate the true 
















































II. ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM 
Separatist problems in the south of Thailand are centered in the region’s Muslim 
community, with its distinct culture, traditions, history and language.  The separatist 
militants that operate in the south essentially want to break free from the predominantly 
Buddhist Thailand and form a separate Islamic state. The issue is inherently complicated 
because it originates from many causes. However there are two main sets of factors, 
internal and external, that complicate the problem. 
 
A. INTERNAL FACTORS 
1. Ethnic, Cultural and Religious Problems 
Beginning in the 1930s, successive Thai Military regimes, which received power 
from the Thai Monarchy, tried to modify the concept of popular sovereignty and instill a 
common national unity. Because of this drive toward Thai nationalism, the government 
implemented “Assimilation Policies” in order to unify the separate cultures into one Thai 
community. Muslims were strongly affected by the assimilation policies. For example, 
Muslims in the South were forbidden to dress in the Malay sarong, to use the Malay 
language and Malay or Arabic names. In addition, Sharia law (Islamic law) which 
governed matters of Muslim marriage and land inheritance was forcibly replaced by Thai 
law (Forbes, 1989). These programs tried to create a unified Thai nation by promoting 
Thai as the national language and Buddhism as the state religion. According to Isaacson 
& Rubenstein (2002), 
Several keys changes were introduced. The old local government 
structure, which had, at least, allowed some autonomous Malay political 
representation, was replaced by a simpler and more centralized system. 
Three provincial units were carved from the original Pattani region – 
Pattani Yala, and Narathiwat – all of which were placed under direct 
control of the Ministry of the Interior. In 1939 a modernization program 
was also initiated to eliminate “backward” Islamic customs and dialects 
and enforce uniformity in language and social behavior. Western cultural 
and customary habits were stressed, the Muslim Friday holiday was 
banned and steps were taken to phase out, altogether, the use of the 
Islamic law. (p. 166) 
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Because of these programs, Thai Muslims were forced to change their language, 
customs, and societal standards which had been in place since the Pattani Sultinate. These 
changes under the assimilation policy generated a great deal of resentment among the 
Muslim population of Thailand.  As a result of this friction, a predominant Thai Muslim 
leader, Hiji Sulong, tried to negotiate with the Thai government by submitting a seven-
point list of demands.  Within the list was the call for an end of the assimilation policy.  
The Thai government responded by arresting Sulong and charging him with treason 
(Kamel, 2004). Following this incident, Muslim separatism began to spread through the 
Thai Muslim communities in the south.  The movement was believed to be necessary 
among Muslims in order to protect their cultural and religious beliefs.  Muslim 
resentment towards the government’s assimilation policies turned from localized 
resistance to broad support for the Muslim separatist groups, such as the Pattani United 
Liberation Organization (PULO). Since the 1960s, Muslim separatist groups have 
operated in the southern Thai provinces, although the assimilation policies of the past no 
longer exist, and today Muslim separatists continue to use the history of the policy to 
claim legitimacy in the fight against the government. Don Pathan, an American citizen 
born to Thai Muslim parents who writes for The Nation newspaper (an English language 
newspaper in Thailand) has observed, 
The Thai government has tried to use the Nation/ State religion/ Monarch 
as one entity, but the nation, supposedly secular, is really Buddhist. It 
alienates the Muslims. Identity of Muslims is very important. Muslim 
identity and religion is one thing.  When the government affects one part, 
it affects the whole thing.  The south is very bitter.  Everyone knows the 
history of Ayutaya, Chiang Mai, etc.  But no one knows the history of the 
Kingdom of Pattani.  The government needs to acknowledge that Muslims 
have a strong history of their own.  The southerners don’t have a problem 
with Thailand, but they want to be acknowledged (2004). 
Pathan’s comments clarify the issue regarding the resentment that still 
exists in the south today.  Many of the Thai Muslims want nothing more than 




 2. Social, Economic and Political Problems 
Because of the distinct culture, traditions, language, and religious aspects of their 
community, Thai Muslims in southern Thailand often feel that they have been 
discriminated against by the Thai government, although they are not legally restricted 
from practicing their religion. In addition, the Thai government in the past has not paid 
attention to developing the economy and infrastructure in the southern provinces to the 
same degree as in other areas. According to Billy (2004),  
The underdeveloped nature of southern Thailand relative to the rest of the 
country has contributed greatly to Muslim feeling of deprivation and 
marginalization. In fact, Muslim provinces account for only 1.5% of 
Thailand’s gross domestic product. The south has virtually no industry, the 
infrastructure is abysmal and tourism is underdeveloped despite extensive 
natural beauty. (p. 4) 
This reality supports the strong feeling among Thai Muslims that they are 
discriminated against by their Buddhist countrymen.  Moreover, the administrative 
officials in the south, of which the majorities are Thai Buddhists, have fundamental 
problems in understanding the Muslim culture and the language.  These problems result in 
communication failures between Buddhist officials and Muslim locals. Recently, Dr. 
Surachart from Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok said in an interview that Thai 
officials in the south have failed to understand basic Muslim cultural intricacies such as 
not using dogs to search Muslim houses, walking into mosques with shoes on, and 
searching Muslim women with male security personnel (2004). On the other hand, Thai 
officials also have a history of corruption, arbitrary repression, and often brutal internal 
security measures which has fostered a general sense of social dissatisfaction, antagonism, 
frustration and alienation. Because of this misadministration and the sense of antagonism 
towards Muslims, the Islamic community erupted during a violent incident on April 28, 
1948.  In this pivotal event know as the Dusun Nyiur incident – a violent clash between 
Thai police and Pattanese Muslims – an estimated 1,100 Muslims and 30 policemen were 
killed (Billy, 2004). After this incident, the clashes between Thai officials and Muslims 
increased and contributed to the creation and rise of more militant Muslim separatist 
groups.  
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Regarding southern politics, Thai Muslims in the south have not had the same 
opportunities to participate in the political process because of a general lack of education. 
McCargo (2004) mentions that, “Although the government was in theory keen to increase 
the number of Muslims in the bureaucracy, in practice numerous obstacles ranging from 
educational attainment to demands for social conformity have limited such recruitment, 
especially to the higher grades” (p. 7). Political alienation of the very community that is 
being governed in the south has only added to the frictions that exist. 
 Another factor that has contributed to the conflict between the Thai government 
and Thai Muslims in the south is the government’s support for the US invasions of 
Afghanistan and Iraq.  Bures (2004) mentions that “Thailand’s active role in the US-led 
war on terrorism has further estranged those in the south who see the global conflict as a 
war on Muslims”(p. 3). For the most part, Thai Muslims in the south of Thailand disagree 
with the government’s role, but a formal system is not in place for Muslims to voice their 
opinions. Brown (2003) writes that, “Fortunately, most Thai Muslims are peaceful. Those 
opposed to America’s involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan have expressed their 
opposition lawfully with demonstrations and a call for a boycott of American goods” (p. 
1). In addition, Dr. Panitan of Chulalongkorn University noted in an interview, “Southern 
Muslims hear conspiracy theories that the CIA and US Special Forces are inciting the 
violence in the south so that the US War on Terror can be brought to Thailand” (2004, 
September 14). Regardless of the validity of such claims, the fact that they exist in 
conjunction with the Thai government’s open support for the US War on Terror in the 
Middle East has contributed to the south’s violence.   
 
B. EXTERNAL FACTORS 
While internal factors within Thailand’s borders have had a considerable effect on 
the southern insurgency, external factors have fueled the fire of militancy as well.  The 
way that southern Muslims think and act is affected by the forces of international Islamic 
Fundamentalism, as well as by the actions of international terrorist organizations. Young 
Muslims in the south have proven to be especially impressionable to the external world 
situation.  As a whole, however, the entire Muslim community in the Thai south interprets 
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the situation in the world today, including the US War on Terror and Thailand’s support of 
it, as a conflict waged against Muslims.  External factors such as these have generated 
resentment among southern Thai Muslims who oppose what is perceived to be an attack 
on Islam.   
 
1.  International Islamic Fundamentalism  
After the attack on January 4th, 2004, many analysts speculated that the Muslim 
separatists were receiving some support from international terrorist groups. Retired 
General Kiti Rattanachaya, the former southern army commander and national security 
advisor, traced the genesis of terrorism in Thailand to the Soviet-Afghan war when many 
Thais and other Southeast Asian Muslim youth went to Afghanistan to fight alongside the 
Mujahideen (Wannabovorn, 2004).  Unfortunately, the exact number of Thais who 
participated in such action is unknown because of the absence of a comprehensive 
immigration system.  When the war was over and the Muslim youth returned home, they 
formed their own organizations such as the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in Indonesia, the 
Kampulan Mujahideen in Malaysia (KMM), and the Mujahideen Pattani in Thailand. The 
Thai government initially did not accept the speculation that such groups existed, but as 
the years following the Soviet-Afghan war progressed, evidence corroborated among 
governments proved otherwise.  Similarly, most Southeast Asian nations also chose to 
deny such activities for fear of jeopardizing tourism, economic investment from abroad, 
etc.  Nevertheless, according to Jane’s Intelligence Review (2003), a new Muslim 
Separatist group, the Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP) and founded by young 
Afghanistan veterans, appeared in Thailand and sought to re-energize a separatist struggle 
with jihadi ideology. As a result, radical Muslims now appear to have gravitated to the 
Middle Eastern Wahhabist brand of Islam, a very strict and narrow interpretation of Islam 
that Osama Bin Laden himself follows. Misinformation from the Wahabbis has often 
portrayed Mulims as an oppressed people engaged in a unified struggle against a common 
enemy.  
In addition, many of Thailand’s Muslim communities have a tradition by which 
their young men and women travel overseas to study in Middle East in countries such as 
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Egypt, Saudi Arabia. After graduating from schools in the Middle East, these Muslims 
come back home to teach in the Islamic schools in Thailand. Amy Kazmin, a writer from 
the Financial Times (2004), reports that “Muslim intellectuals are now admitting that 
some Islamic schools harbour [sic] religious teachers who – inspired by their own studies 
in the Middle East and developments in the Islamic world – may be preaching radical 
interpretations of Islamic law, sanctifying violence against Thai authorities” (p. 2). This 
type of activity perpetuates Islamic fundamentalism in the Thai Muslim communities.  
The Thai government has traditionally ignored the system of institutionalized 
Islamic schooling in Southern Thailand.  The government in the past has viewed these 
schools primarily as religious venues and, therefore, has not been interested in regulating 
such institutions.  These pondok (private Islamic boarding schools that are primarily 
financed by donations from the local populations) perform a key role in providing 
religious instruction and also in deepening the community’s understanding of Islam. The 
pondok provide basic Islamic courses in Malay and Arabic, the curricula of which are 
difficult for the Thai government to control because all official actions in Thailand are 
conducted in the Thai language. This difference in language is a weak point of Thai 
governance which the Islamic teachers who have returned from the Middle East exploit in 
order to place the Wahhabi doctrine into the schools’ curriculums. Schools that preach the 
Wahhabi doctrine often receive funding from Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern 
countries as well. According to Davis (2003), 
Undoubtedly the most prominent, if controversial, figure in Thai Wahhabi 
circles is Dr Ismail Lutfi Japakiya, an internationally recognized scholar 
and rector of the Yala Islamic College. Lutfi, who studied in Saudi Arabia, 
has served as an important conduit for Saudi funding, and the new campus 
of the Yala Islamic College. (p. 4) 
The result is that these schools exist as conduits for the Islamic 
fundamentalist recruiting and training of young Muslims. 
As a result of the Wahhabi doctrine and teachings, the goal of some southern 
Muslims has shifted from one of separatism to a stronger, more violent strategy of 
jihadist ambition aimed at killing infidels and non-believers. This goal has been 
evidenced by the violent incidents which now are focused not only on the government 
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officials, but also civilians, monks, normal school teachers, and some moderate Muslims 
who support the government. Radical fundamentalists in the south now conduct the same 
type of terrorist operations as the religious terrorist groups in the Middle East.  These 
include tactics such as car bombings, suicide attacks, assassinations, and so on. On April 
28, 2004, young Muslim separatists (18-20 years old) armed with guns, knives, and 
machetes attacked government forces at seven points around the southern provinces.  
Many were heard shouting in Malay, “The time to liberate has come,” and “There are no 
other gods. We will die for our god” (“Rebels die in bloodbath,” 2004). On this day, 107 
Muslim separatists were killed, including 32 separatists who were killed in the Kru Se 
Mosque, which they used as headquarters. After searching the separatists’ houses, 
officials found a 34 page jihadist manual, titled Ber Jihad Di Pattani (The Holy Struggle 
for Pattani), which distorted over 60 points from the Koran to mislead militants into 
making sacrifices for the separatist cause (Nanuam, 2004).  The information within this 
manual confirms that Islamic fundamentalism is one of the causes of the renewal of 
Muslim Separatism in Thailand. 
 
2. International Terrorist Organizations   
Following the Thai/CIA arrest of Hambali, the JI’s Operations Chief and alleged 
mastermind behind the 2003 Bali bombings, Thai officials speculate that other 
transnational terrorist groups are also operating in Thailand.  Along with such speculation 
is the belief that the southern violence that exists today is potentially supported by 
organizations such as JI.  Considering the sophistication and systematic approach to the 
January 4 and April 28, 2004 attacks in the south, the possibility of international 
influences is not unrealistic. 
 
a. Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) 
Jemaah Islamiyah is a Southeast Asian terrorist network which plotted in 
secrecy through the late 1990s, following the stated goal of creating an idealized Islamic 
fundamentalist state comprising Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the southern 
Philippines, and southern Thailand. In October 2002, the United States Government 
designated Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. JI is an extremist 
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group linked to Al-Qaeda and other regional terrorist groups, and has cells operating 
throughout Southeast Asia. JI has demonstrated its capability to carry out transnational 
attacks in locations where Westerners congregate. For example, JI was responsible for the 
Bali bombing on October12, 2002, which killed nearly 200 and wounded 300 others. The 
Bali plot was apparently the final outcome of a meeting in early 2002 in Thailand which 
was able to occur as the result of a weak Thai central authority, lax or corrupt law 
enforcement, and open borders which allowed JI operatives to enter the country (“Jemaah 
Islamiya,” 2004). 
In the violent Muslim separatist attack on April 28, 2004, seven of the 
dead Islamic insurgents were from countries other than Thailand, and one had the letters 
JI stitched onto his jacket (Bradley, 2004). This evidence convinced the Thai government 




Al-Qaeda is multi-national, with members from numerous countries, and 
possesses a worldwide presence. Senior leaders in the organization are also senior leaders 
in other terrorist organizations, including those designated by the Department of State as 
foreign terrorist organizations. Al-Qaeda seeks a global radicalization of existing Islamic 
groups and the creation of radical Islamic groups where none exist. Al-Qaeda’s current 
goal is to establish a pan-Islamic Caliphate throughout the world by working with allied 
Islamic extremist groups to overthrow regimes it deems “non-Islamic” and expelling 
Westerners and non-Muslim from Muslim countries. After the removal of the Taliban 
from power in late 2001, Al-Qaeda has dispersed into small groups across South Asia, 
Southeast Asia, and the Middle East (“Al-Qaida,” 2004). 
In Thailand, government officials had evidence of the presence of several 
Al-Qaeda members, Khallad bin Attash, Khalid al-Mihdhar, and Nawaf al-Hazmi, in 
January 2000. Malaysian and US intelligence agencies tracked these men through 
communications intercepts and alerted Thai authorities of their travel to the Kingdom.  
Thai intelligence received the information on a weekend, and by the time the information 
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was processed and the seriousness of the situation realized, the men had disappeared into 
Bangkok.  Thai authorities put the men’s names on the travel watch list, but all three left 
the country unnoticed.  It was not until weeks after the men’s departures, sometime in 
February 2000, that Thai intelligence notified anyone of the departures, and at the time 
they only notified the Malaysians and not the US intelligence authorities.  It was later 
discovered that the only reason the Thais mentioned the departures to the Malaysian 
authorities was because Malaysia had asked Thailand for several weeks for the 
whereabouts of the missing terrorists.   
Later intelligence revealed that Khallad had proceeded to Karachi on 
January 20.  He would go on to mastermind the USS Cole attack in Yemen that killed 17 
US servicemen.  Nawaf and Khalid left Bangkok on January 15, on a United Airlines 
Flight to Los Angeles. Once in the US, Nawaf and Khalid traveled across the country and 
met with members of another AQ cell, identified as the “Hamburg” cell, which was later 
found to be instrumental in the 9/11 attacks on the US (John, 2004). Evidence such as this 
suggests that Al-Qaeda can easily contact other cells that may exist in Thailand. 
 
C. ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 
Information gathered from the Thai National Security Council in the book Inside 
the Muslim Separatist Problem in the South,. which was printed by the Thailand Ministry 
of the Interior in 2004, shows that Muslim separatist organizations in southern Thailand 
have a distinct and well-organized strategy for revolution. They expand their organization 
by the same seven-step process that Communist revolutionaries in Thailand used several 
decades ago. In the Islamic fundamentalist model, the focus is religious motivation, 
rather than the Communists’ political and economic motivations.  In a related note, it is 
worth stating that the ideology of southern Muslim militants has slowly changed from 
one of liberating Pattani from Siam (Thailand) to liberating Muslims from the infidels 
(Pathan, 2004). 
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1. The Seven Step Strategy of Islamic Revolution in Southern Thailand 
 
 
Figure 3.   Seven steps of Islamic revolution 
(From Inside the Muslim Separatist Problem in the South, 2004, p.58). 
 
In the seven steps of Islamic revolution (see Figure 1), the first step involves 
Muslim separatists and their propagandistic attempt to persuade the Muslim community 
to take action against the Thai government.  This propaganda is primarily aimed at young 
Muslims and is reinforced with claims of mistreatment and injustice on the part of Thai 
government officials.  This strategy is formulated within the context of Muslim religious 
motivation – the driving force for young Muslims to join the militant organizations. In 
the second step of the process, fundamentalists infiltrate mass organizations, such as 
Muslim religious associations and Islamic schools, in order to establish a presence and 











































the fourth step, fundamentalists recruit additional Muslims through the infiltrated mass 
organizations.  The ultimate goal, which is partially achieved at this time, is to have a 
total of 30,000 religious members, 3,000 members for “normal” missions, and 300 
members who conduct the most extreme, violent commando-type actions that promise the 
reward of martyrdom. In the fifth step, key leaders indoctrinate the recruited population 
with Islamic fundamentalism and tactical training in the use of guerrilla tactics, including 
terrorism. In this fifth step, members are given the ultimate test by being required to 
conduct an actual operation in support of the organization’s goals. During the sixth step 
of the process, members are deployed for harassment operations against symbols of the 
government such as government officials, tourists, and Buddhist monks who are seen as 
infidels. These terror tactics are used to discredit the Thai government in the eyes of 
impressionable Muslims in the south, as well as to gain support and resources from 
members of the international community who have similar fundamentalist’s ideologies. 
In the seventh and final step, the extremist leaders employ Muslim militants to fight the 
jihad, similar to the fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan, in order to establish a pure 
Islamic state (Inside the Muslim Separatist Problem in the South, 2004). 
 
2. Training 
Muslim separatist leaders often motivate recruits by communicating cases of Thai 
government oppression against Muslims throughout history.  Mixed with ideological 
propaganda, the militant leadership demonstrates the need for a jihadist revolution to 
protect the institution of Islam.  Recruited members of militant organizations in the south 
learn that it is the duty of Muslims to strive for a separate, Islamic state.  Muslim 
separatist leaders maintain secrecy in their operations by using both religion and a 
personal oath taken upon the Koran as the basis for the recruits to maintain secrecy.  
Intelligence based on the information from confiscated books taken from a BRN 
member in the south revealed that Muslim separatists recruit and train young Muslims 
through a networked pyramid-like organizational structure, similar to a direct-sale 
business. Each cell in the network has five to seven members, and each cell only knows 
the members within that cell. This process was revealed during the interview of a 
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journalist, Pathan, who knows Postah Soh (real name Ishmael Rayalong), one of the key 
leaders behind the violence in the south. Pathan (2004) mentions that Soh has recruited 
otherwise “good kids” for four years from different provinces to perform violent acts and 
continues to organize people into 4 – 5 man cells. 
Each cell is trained in secret locations, one of which exists in each province of 
Yala, Narathiwat, and Pattani. When young Muslims are selected for the secret location 
training, they must first go to a rally point and meet a guide who will take them to the 
training site. The training typically occurs continuously between 8:00 pm and 5: 00 am 
the next morning. During training, young Muslims do not know the instructors who use 
fake names and are disguised with black uniforms and face masks. The training is divided 
into three levels. First, recruits are trained in physical fitness in preparation for tactical 
training. Second, they are trained in guerrilla tactics, including weapons training. Rubber 
plantations are often the training grounds for such instruction.  Finally, recruits are 
deployed on a real-world commando operation as the culminating step in the training.  
The duration of such training is unspecified and recruits continue training until they have 
the capability to succeed in real-world operations (Inside the Muslim Separatist Problem 
in the South, 2004).  
 
3. Operations 
After training is complete, the newly trained militants await orders to report to a 
specified rally point when leaders require operations to be conducted.  At the rally point, 
the militants are issued their weapons.  They then conduct the specified operations on the 
target(s), return the weapons, and separate from each other in order to remain undetected 
by government officials. What is most interesting is that when meet at rally points to 
conduct operations, they do not know who the other people in the group are until they 
meet.  Sometimes, militants do not even know that members of their own hometowns are 
part of the extremist organization until seeing them at the rally points (Inside the Muslim 
Separatist Problem in the South, 2004). Pathan, (2004, September 16) a journalist with 
the Nation  (the English newspaper in Thailand),  mentions that an assassin who killed a 
police officer on July 22, 2004 did not find out the target until the week of the 
 29
assassination from a driver who was from the same village; neither knew that the other 
was part of the organization.  This information confirms the way of Muslim separatists 
operate. They simply join together and conduct the operation. This process was 
demonstrated in the other violent incidents of April 28, 2004, in which young Muslims 
assembled in the designated mosque and then proceeded to simultaneously attack 










































































III. APPLYING THE MYSTIC DIAMOND THEORY 
The Thai Mystic Diamond Model (see Figure 2) was created by modifying the 
Mystic Diamond Counterinsurgency Model created by Dr. Gordon H. McCormick of the 
Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA (2003). The purpose of the model 
represented here is to provide a general understanding of the problem of insurgency that 
exists in southern Thailand today.  This model is very important in understanding the 
strategy necessary to eliminate the insurgency in the south. From this model, practical 
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Figure 4.   Thai Mystic Diamond Model. 
(After the Mystic Diamond Theory by Dr. Gordon H. McCormick) 
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In the model, the Thai government, Thai Muslims, Muslim Separatists, 
International Radical Muslim, the UN and International Community, and The King of 
Thailand are depicted as the major contributors to the model.  
 
A. THE ROYAL THAI GOVERNMENT 
The Royal Thai government administers the nation state in which the Muslim 
insurgency/separatism exists.  The government is a constitutional monarchy consisting of 
parliament as the legislative body with the King of Thailand having ultimate veto power.  
The government of Thailand became a constitutional monarchy in 1932, prior to which it 
was an absolute monarchy. 
 
B. THAI MUSLIMS 
The Thai Muslim community is the target of Muslim separatists for recruiting, 
organizing, and supervising. The majority of Thai Muslims are moderates who don’t 
want to separate from Thailand.  In reality the southern Muslims only want equal justice, 
equality, and their Muslim identity to be recognized within the predominantly Buddhist 
country. Most do not want to use violent means to fight the Thai government but prefer a 
peaceful means to negotiate with the Thai government.  
 
C. THE KING OF THAILAND 
The King of Thailand has influence over the Royal Thai Government. Although 
the government is predominantly ruled by the Prime Minister, the King has considerable 
power over all aspects of Thai government and politics.  The King can influence 
decisions within the government, and has the power to veto decisions, elections, etc., if 
he feels that the people of Thailand are not being fairly represented.  In the case of the 
Thai Muslims, the King is an important link between the people and the government in 
Bangkok because Thai citizens know and respect the King, and they feel comfortable 
talking to him.  The King receives support from the Royal Armed Forces, and he has the 
power to influence their actions.  While not a political figure, the King has both ultimate 
veto power and extraordinary influence over the nation’s government.  Additionally, it 
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should be noted that moderate Muslims in Thailand respect and accept the King of 
Thailand and the royal family as their own royal family.  The King and the Royal Family 
are important participants in all Muslim ceremonies in the Kingdom. Simply put, when 
the King of Thailand speaks, everyone stops and listens.  
 
D. THE MUSLIM SEPARATISTS 
Muslim separatists are those fundamentalists who try to mobilize the young 
Muslims of the south into taking up arms and conducting an insurgency.  The separatists 
want to separate from the predominantly Buddhist Thailand.  The separatists essentially 
want to create a separate Muslim state which unifies both faith and governance. They 
think the Islamic ummah (community) should be a puritanical Islamic society where the 
state is charged with the enforcement of Shariah (divine) law. These fundamentalists first 
try to encourage young Muslims to join the radical organizations; then they indoctrinate, 
train, and mobilize the recruits to fight the government. The situation that allows for the 
growth of such separatism stems from economic and social underdevelopment in the 
south, a repressed minority, Islamic fundamentalist propaganda, and international 
influences. These areas of concern have energized the violent incidents in the south. 
 
E. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITIES 
International organizations support both sides of the conflict (the separatists’ and 
the Thai government’s). Radical Muslim organizations around the world, many of which 
come from the Middle East and promote Islamic fundamentalism, give support to Muslim 
separatists in Thailand through financial contributions , training, and other resources. 
International organizations that are connected with the rest of the free world, including 
the US and other UN members, support the Thai government and assist when possible.  
As a result, both sides of the conflict have separate mechanisms in place for gaining and 




F. CONNECTIONS THAT EXIST WITHIN THE THAI 
COUNTERINSURGENCY MODEL 
In the model, Muslim separatists exist as a counter state actor who wants to 
separate from the Thai nation state. The Muslim separatists gain support from the Muslim 
community by indoctrinating young Muslims in Islamic schools into Islamic 
fundamentalism. Today, young Muslims are inspired by religious motivations, ideas of 
going to heaven through jihad, and fundamentalist propaganda that distorts Islam. They 
receive support in the form of finances, logistics, and training from international radical 
Muslim organizations which share the same ideology.  
Muslim separatists try to discredit the Thai government and increase their 
influence through a three-pronged strategy.  First , they target young, moderate Muslims.  
They do this by taking advantage of the new Islamic conflicts that exist around the world 
today to influence curriculum in schools and ultimately affect political goals. Second, the 
Muslim fundamentalists affect the mechanism between the Muslim community and the 
government.  They do this by exploiting the mistreatment by the Thai government in the 
past, and the wrong policies which were used by the Thai government to oppress the 
Muslim minority.  Third, they target the government mechanism directly by conducting 
operations directly against Thai government officials and symbols of the government 
such as Thai schools and police stations.  
The Thai government is a nation state actor who tries to conduct 
counterinsurgency. The Thai government receives support from the international 
community in gaining legitimacy for its fight against the Muslim separatists. The Thai 
government must use the proper methods in conducting operations in order to gain 
support from the international community. The government also has three strategic ways 
in which it conducts counterinsurgency.  First, the government attempts to win the 
popular support of the moderate Muslims by reducing the cultural, economic, and social 
gaps between Thai Buddhists and Thai Muslims.  It does this through development 
programs which aim to lessen the economic gap that exists between Muslims and the rest 
of the country. Second, the government seeks to cut the connection between the Muslim 
separatists and the young Muslims who are easily recruited by them. Finally, the 
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government conducts military operations directly against the leaders of the Muslim 
separatist organizations in order to destroy the core of each organization. The moderate 
Muslim community is the most important actor, and the one whom the Muslim separatists 
and the Thai government both want to control in order to reach their respective goals.  
But another important actor in the model who has influence in Thailand is the 
King. He has influence within the Thai government and Thai Muslim community. He can 
coordinate with both sides. On the government side, the King can give guidance and 
recommendations to the Thai government on conducting counterinsurgency in the 
Muslim community through peaceful means. In the Muslim community, the King can 
talk with the leaders of Thai Muslims to understand the real problems within the Thai 
Muslim community, many of which these Muslims do not feel confident discussing with 
political members of the Thai government. The King can be an influential mediator for 
both sides since he is the central figure of all Thai people. 
In order to gather support from the radical international community, Muslim 
separatists have increased their militant movement to attract attention from outside 
Thailand.  This strategy has resulted in the killing of government officials, monks, and 
innocent civilians.  The burning of official buildings and the bombing government of 
facilities are also now common.  The Thai government, on the other hand, also tries to 
coordinate with neighboring countries, such as Malaysia, in tracking Muslim separatists 
when they cross the border. In addition, the Thai government attempts to get support 
from international organizations and countries in order to receive intelligence from 
friendly nations and the UN.  In reciprocation for such intelligence, the Thai government 
attempts to uphold human rights standards and to maintain favorable status with the 
international community.  While Muslim extremists talk with the UN about human rights 
abuses by the Thai government, the Thai government likewise works with international 
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IV. COMMUNIST COUNTERINSURGENCY CASE STUDY FROM 
THE MID-1980S 
A review of the past counterinsurgency in Thailand provides some useful insight 
into an effective current strategy for success.  In the counterinsurgency efforts of the mid-
1980s, a primary lesson learned was that a military-only approach to targeting communist 
militants did not work.  Instead, political and social activities on the part of the 
government also were used to address the key concerns of communist militants.  In that 
regard, seeking and receiving participation from the local populations throughout 
Thailand in helping to resolve the problem was seen by the government as critical 
component for success.  These basic tenets formed the basis for important lessons learned 
after an initial stage of military-only action that was not effective in quelling the violence.  
However, today military action is again being applied as the primary strategy aimed at 
eliminating the southern violence, and while fighting communists and fighting separatists 
may be different in several ways, including the most basic and fundamental area of 
ideology, the lessons that were successful in the past can still be applied today. 
 
A. THE ORIGINS OF THAI INSURGENCY 
The insurgent movement in Thailand in the mid-1980s contained both 
Communist-inspiration and Communist motivation. Communism in Thailand dates back 
to the 1920s, when Chinese and Vietnamese party representatives first made contact with 
their respective national communities in the Thai Kingdom. From that early date, 
communism in Thailand found its principal support within these ethnic minorities, rather 
than among the Thai themselves. The first formal Communist party in Thailand was 
founded in 1933 and called the Chinese Communist Party of Thailand (CCPT). That the 
CCPT was explicitly labeled Chinese indicates the narrow ethnic base of the early 
Communist movement, as well as one of the principal reasons for the CCPT’s lack of 
appeal to the vast majority of Thai, who viewed the local Chinese as an alien presence. 
Despite, the difficulties for communism in penetrating Thai society because of the Thai’s 
proud history, their belief in Theravada Buddhism, and the sacrificed King, all of which 
fostered the unity of Thailand, the second local Communist party, the Communist Party 
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of Thailand (CPT), was founded in 1942 out of the instability of political and 
socioeconomic problems (Randolph & Thompson, 1981). In addition, Randolph & 
Thompson (1981) mention that in the 1950s, the Malaysian Communist Party, which was 
defeated by the British, sought sanctuary with minorities in the far south, and established 
the Communist Terrorist Organization (CTO) which then coordinated with the CPT.  But 
the expansion of the CPT was slowed by the Thai Government’s enactment of the anti-
communist law, which passed the congress in 1933, and permitted the arrest those who 
coordinated with the communist. In addition, the Thai people at that time viewed 
communism as something alien. However, in 1961, the CPT took steps to lay the 
groundwork for an open insurgency by declaring an armed struggle strategy, which was 
the proper strategy for a revolution in Thailand, at the Third Congress of the CPT 
(Randolph & Thompson, 1981). 
 
B. THE WAY OF REVOLUTION  
The insurgents received support from China and Vietnam, both of which claimed 
that this support was used to punish Thailand for its cooperation with the United States. 
In 1962, a Northeast Region jungle headquarters was established to direct the planned 
insurgency and a Farmer Liberation Association was formed in the Northeast to support 
the jungle guerrillas (Marks, 1996). In addition, the clandestine radio stations, the Voice 
of the People of Thailand (VPT) and Radio Peking, broadcast propaganda for the 
revolution to the Thai people. The clandestine radio stations used both the ethnic 
divisions, and regional and local inequities to demonstrate the wrongs of the government 
administration. In addition, citing the growth of US activities, such as the development of 
American air bases in Thailand, these radio stations also spread anti-Americanism 
propaganda as a theme to the rural areas which didn’t want foreigners using their land 
(Randolph & Thompson, 1981). These forms of propagandas from the radio stations were 
applied to the rural areas to support the plan which focused on encircling towns near the 
countryside and using urban activities such as strikes, demonstrations, and parliamentary 
action in a supportive role. The most seriously targeted regions were the far south, the 
north, and the northeast of Thailand because these regions contained such ethnic 
minorities as the Meo, Mong, and Karen in the north, and Thai Muslims in the south, in 
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addition to the inequality of life apparent in the northeast region (Randolph & Thompson, 
1981). The insurgency began with the establishment of the base areas which served as the 
rear line and strategic bases in these regions. The insurgents then created guerrilla zones 
around the base areas to expand their influence until they had encircled the cities, and 
finally supplanted the local government in all aspects of administration. Miniature states 
in effect, these base areas were usually established only after extensive political 
indoctrination of the local populace had been achieved. At the same time, in the urban 
activities, the CPT attempted to establish legal mass organizations and infiltrate such 
existing organizations. For example, the CPT infiltrated the Socialist party of Thailand, 
the National Student Center of Thailand, and the Labor Union responsible for 
establishing a Coordinating Committee for the Patriotic (composed of students, farmers, 
and labors) to oppose the government in its administration and its support  of the US. In 
early 1979, the CPT units were able to be active in 35 of the country’s 71 provinces and 
had approximately 12, 000 guerrillas (Randolph & Thompson, 1981).  
 
C. THE RESPONSE OF THE THAI GOVERNMENT  
The Thai government responded to the communist insurgency by establishing the 
Communist Suppression Operation Command (CSOC) which was led by the Royal Thai 
Army in December 1965, and charged with coordinating the various government 
agencies (Marks, 1996). The CSOC made a Thai Counterinsurgency Doctrine called the 
“CPM (Civil- Police-Military)” (Tanham, 1974, p. 89). Tanham (1974) mentions that this 
doctrine authorized the coordinated application of all resources to the insurgency problem 
including a mix of civil, police, and purely military measures. The essential tasks of this 
doctrine were militarily to create security in the areas, to control by police the population 
and resources, and to eliminate by civil service units the reasons for any grievance 
originating from the social or economic inequalities. Following this doctrine, the CSOC 
divided Thailand into four regions which were under the command of the Army Region 
commander (Tanham, 1974). In each CSOC, the CPM Task Force had to conduct the 
operation. In the civilian section, their objectives were to facilitate communication 
between the government and the rural population, to improve the peasants’ economic 
status, and to help develop leadership in local government. They used the rural 
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development programs from the Thai government and some support from the United 
States’ Agency for International Development (AID) to improve the infrastructure and 
apply the Self-Help method to the local situations for long term development and 
improvement (Tanham, 1974). In the police sector, the objectives were to control the 
population in the area, to find information to support the military, and to secure the 
resources in the areas. The police increased the police stations in the districts and 
provided police patrol projects in the villages in order to provide a presence in as much of 
the country as possible, especially in the areas threatened by the insurgency. In addition, 
the Border Patrol Police, a paramilitary force, was used to work closely with the 
villagers, especially the hill tribesmen, to gain the loyalty and develop useful sources of 
information about the activities of the communists (Tanham, 1974). In the military sector, 
the objectives were to destroy the guerillas in the base areas, to disturb the guerrillas in 
the guerrilla zone, and to provide the security in the area. The Royal Thai Army played a 
key role in this counterinsurgency effort by giving to the First Army in Bangkok 
authority in the Central and Western areas, to The Second Army authority in the 
Northeast, to the Third Army authority in the North, and to the Forth Army authority in 
the South. The Army region commander also was the CSOC region commander as well. 
Each Army region, which was supported by a Special Forces battalion, had a 
counterinsurgency training camp and the basic counterinsurgency course was from nine 
to twelve weeks for the company-size unit (Tanham, 1974). In addition, Tanham (1974) 
mentions that the Royal Thai Army tried to isolate the guerrilla forces from the 
population by establishing a village protection unit or the joint security team, which was 
composed of two policemen and ten or more volunteers in the villages surrounding the 
target areas. The teams received approximately one month of training from the Royal 
Thai Army. Their missions were to protect the villagers from attack by guerrillas and to 
prevent guerrillas from gaining food and supplies from the villages. In each of the target 
areas, there was usually also an army unit, commonly a platoon but sometimes a 
company, and a control headquarters located in the most tactically suitable village. The 
control headquarters was in communication with higher headquarters and the joint 
security team in the villages. The army unit was a strike force that could be used to 
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support the joint security teams in case of danger, or to attack the guerrillas when they 
were located (Tanham, 1974). These teams relieved the army of the responsibility for 
securing the areas. 
In addition, the Thai government by the National Security Command (NSC) also 
had the Mobile Development Unit (MDU) which combined the efforts of the military and 
civilian agencies to provide a government presence in the rural areas, and the government 
radio stations, such as Radio Station 909 in Sakon Nakhon, conducted psychological 
operations on the role of the government (Tanham, 1974). In the South, Tanham (1974) 
mention that the CTO problem was reduced by establishing a Regional Border 
Committee Organization (RBCO) which was composed of Thai and Malaysian officials 
in 1965. The RBOC carried out the day-to-day coordination of the joint operations 
between Malaysian police and Thai Border Police Patrol. In addition, the Thai and 
Malaysian nations had a strategic agreement regarding the hot pursuit and the use of 
Malaysian police in Thailand. 
 
D. THE ROLE OF THE KING IN THE THAI COMMUNIST 
COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY 
The Thai King has been and is commonly viewed as the head of the nation, the 
preeminent political institution in the nation, and the focus point for national unity.  
Because of a constitutional monarchy, all Thai governments since 1932, civilian or 
military, have required the approval of the monarch to establish their political legitimacy, 
and his legal status has been recorded in every Thai constitution (Marks, 1996). Past 
kings played an important role in the establishment and the safeguarding of the nation’s 
independence, particularly during the period of Western colonialism. As a result, the 
King continues to be an object of extraordinary popular reverence and also has had the 
influence of the Thai government. 
The current Thai King, Bhumiphol Adulyadoj, has reigned for more than fifty 
years and has enjoyed extraordinary popularity among the Thai people, particularly those 
in rural areas because he has dedicated himself to improving the quality of life for the 
Thai people life through the implementation of Royal Projects. These projects have been 
and are supported by the Thai government agencies. Noting the importance of both the 
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King and these projects with respect to the former counterinsurgency, Marks (1996) 
mentions that, “the King, in particular, was instrumental in encouraging those who sought 
to replace armed suppression with political action” (p. 64).  As a result of his efforts, the 
King’s recommendations still carry influence for both sides in the struggle today, and 
carry the possibility that the Thai government and insurgents may cease the armed 
struggle and accept the peaceful solutions previously implemented to resolve the 
communist problem.  
 
E. CONCLUSION 
The case study of communist counterinsurgency, while different than the strategy 
necessary to fight the Islamic militant movement today, provides useful guidance and 
examples which can be transferred to the new problem.  It should not be forgotten, 
thbough, that the problems behind he communist insurgency were political, social, and 
economic, while the problems behind the insurgency today are motivated by religion and 
ideology.  As a result, the Thai government must realize that identical strategies will not 












V. THE SOLUTION 
The Thai counterinsurgency solution model presented here involves strategic 
guidance to eliminate the problems of the south.  The organizations and units that support 
this guidance with tactical and operational missions must ensure that such missions 
support the overall government strategy discussed here.  The details of the specific 
missions that sub-units and organizations perform must be determined by those sub-
organizations on a case-by-case basis.  Additionally, the government must acknowledge 
that the most important point in all of the models is always to gain the support of the 
population. The below models provide two solutions, one short term (five years or less), 
and one long term (more than five years).   
 
A. THE SHORT TERM SOLUTION 
In the short term solution, the Thai government should focus on the young 
Muslim who is the most influential point of the model. The young Muslim is easily 
persuaded by Muslim separatists and should likewise be the focal point of Thai 
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Figure 5.   Short Term Solution Model. 
(After the Mystic Diamond Model by Dr. Gordon H. McCormick) 
 
In order to affect the Muslim community in the short term, the government must 
focus on the young Muslims.  This is done by providing such youths the same 
opportunities available to young Thai Buddhists.  Such a strategy would include 
providing better educational opportunities, recognizing the Muslim education that these 
young people have already received, providing training in practical job skills, and 
offering amnesty to those youths who agree to cooperate with the government. Also, the 
Muslim community and its families need to focus on the Muslim teenager and provide 
stronger, guiding advice to such youths when they study Islam. In addition, using 
moderate Muslim leaders to properly teach Islam to the Muslim youth of the south is 
critical to developing a moderate population.   
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The second area of emphasis must be to target the mechanisms that connect 
fundamentalists and the Muslim youth.  This targeting may be accomplished first by 
moderating and regulating the schools that educate the Muslims in the south.  Schools 
that teach fundamentalist and Wahabbi Islam should be regulated by the government with 
the assistance of moderate Muslim leaders who are respected by their local communities.  
The teachers in Islamic schools should be required to pass a selection process established 
by a Muslim Education Committee. In addition, each Muslim village should have 
volunteers who receive training from the Thai Armed Force and who can then serve as a 
home guard to monitor the potentially disruptive activities and habits of each village’s 
teenagers, as well as the activities of the stranger who come into the village. 
Finally, with intelligence gathered through trust built with the Muslim 
communities through the programs described above, the Thai government can target the 
third area, individual Muslim leaders who promote violence and recruit Muslim youths 
into radical organizations.  Furthermore, by developing the south and working with 
neighboring countries in the region like Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore, Thailand 
can gain the support of international agencies, and good relationships with these nations 
can then lead to shared intelligence, the arrest of suspected radical Muslims, and 
potentially less violence.   
 
B. THE LONG TERM SOLUTION 
In the long term solution, the Thai government should focus on the majority of 
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Figure 6.   Long Term Solution Model. 
(After the Mystic Diamond Theory by Dr. Gordon H. McCormick) 
 
The first of three long-term strategic policies should target the means by which 
the Muslim majority can be given ownership in solving the problems of the south.  Local 
security and civil servants should be recruited from the pool of local Muslims who have a 
stake in the future of the south.  As a consequence of including the Muslim communities 
in the problem, they gain trust in the government.  By gaining coordination between the 
Muslim communities and the government, the local and national administrations will 
have better control over the actions of the Muslim youth in the south.  Additional aspects 
of government cooperation with the Muslim community of the south should include 
fostering a sense of identity by which the Muslim communities feel that they are part of 
Thailand.  This can be done by developing the economic prosperity of the southern 
provinces, making Muslims feel they are politically and economically equal to their Thai 
Buddhist fellow citizens, and allowing Muslims the freedom they desire to conduct 
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moderate Muslim religious practices.  The combination of these actions will ensure that 
Thai Muslims do not feel alienated from the rest of Thai society.   
The second strategic policy should target the mechanisms and means by which 
school curriculum and teachers are selected, with the intent of regulating the education.  
This can be done by creating a government sanctioned Islamic Education Committee that 
falls under the Thai Ministry of Education.  This committee should select and test 
teachers, register schools, monitor curriculums, and coordinate with the government for 
financial support to the school system.  Such an organization can promote Pattani history 
in schools in order to provide the Muslims of the south with recognition of their identity 
within Thai society.  In addition, increased government support for Thai Muslim 
universities will help to mitigate the perception by Muslims that they need to travel to the 
Middle East for educational purposes.  Such an educational commitment by the 
government would promote a genuine Thai Muslim identity.  With government support 
of such educational reform, the students who graduate from these universities will have 
both the opportunity and priority to hold predominant positions within the educational 
and government sectors.  Additionally, in the long run this government-sponsored system 
will inherently create educated Thai Muslims who can assist in developing the south and 
ending the violence. 
The third strategic policy should target and enhance the government’s ability to 
monitor the movement of individual Muslim separatists.  This can be done with an 
improved immigration system to monitor those entering the country from the Middle 
East.  This is achieved through increased cooperation with the international community.  
Information about Islamic fundamentalists and religious terrorists can be shared through 
intelligence coordination with the international community.  Such cooperation was 
demonstrated in the 2003 arrest of Hambali in Thailand.  His arrest was the result of 
cooperation by the US, Singapore, Malaysia, Cambodia, and other regional allies who 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The renewal of Muslim separatism in the south of Thailand in 2004 is more 
complicated than the problems that existed in the Kingdom in the 1960s. Muslim 
separatists today use the memories of oppression and injustices committed in the past to 
inspire the ideology of Islamic fundamentalism as the future of the Muslim community.  
At the heart of the impressionable Muslim community is the young Thai Muslim, who 
today is a common figure involved with the violent actions and killings in the southern 
provinces. The current world situation in the Middle East reinforces the perception of 
inequality in the world for Muslims.  At the same time, Muslims in southern Thailand are 
not oblivious to the global uprising that other followers of Islam are participating in 
around the world for the sake of preserving religious principles.  Because of the ideology 
associated with Islamic fundamentalism, the strategy of Muslim separatists in Thailand 
has changed from a former reliance on the action of freedom fighters and separatists to 
the current tactics of terrorism.  This situation has proven more difficult to control by 
than the circumstances surrounding the fight against communism in the past.  
In order to fix the problem, the first priority of the Thai government must be to 
develop a plan that encompasses a unity of strategy, operations, and tactics.  Each of 
these three areas can not be successful unless there is simultaneously a well-connected 
and coordinated intelligence system in place. As seen in this thesis, the case study of the 
counterinsurgency in 1980s demonstrates the importance of a unity of policy and 
management, which in the end created a successful operation and national strategy. In 
addition, the counterinsurgency in the 1980s provides some guidance for the Thai 
government’s counterinsurgency policies of today as well. First, the government should 
establish a unified command for the management and balance of civil, police and military 
activities. Second, a centralized policy and decentralized execution must be applied to all 
levels of government operations. Third, police, paramilitary, and home guard should be 
used solely for the purpose of providing local security.  Military forces should only be 
used in a limited role, specifically for small-unit offensive operations. Fourth, it should 
never be forgotten that the popular support of the people is the most critical component of 
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any counterinsurgency strategy. With that in mind, local participation in solving the 
problems of the south, combined with a system of local recruitment of government and 
security officials, can help mitigate the problems.  By using local Muslims and making 
them feel like they have a say in the situation and the future, the Thai government 
simultaneously can gain the trust of the Muslim community itself.  Additionally, 
information warfare, psychological operations, and well-coordinated civil-military 
operations are the instruments that help influence popular support if used properly. Fifth, 
a well-structured intelligence system is important for analyzing the current situation and 
the potential future situation. It is, therefore, essential that the Thai government unify the 
various intelligence units that exist under some umbrella of cooperation.  Sixth, 
development programs in the south should be based primarily on the needs of the local 
people. Seventh, an important aspect of a solution strategy is for the Thai government to 
acknowledge that the present problem is a result of ethno-religious conflicts inside the 
country and Islamic fundamentalist influences from outside the nation’s borders.  
Educating the moderate Muslims of southern Thailand, with special emphasis on the 
young, is therefore a critical step in helping everyone involved understand the problem in 
its entirety.  An Islamic education committee, falling under and regulated by the Ministry 
of Education, can help eliminate the distorted teachings being introduced by radical 
fundamentalists to the youth of the region.  Finally, government officials who are 
Buddhists should be trained in language skills and culture training before working in the 
south.  A simple action such as this can easily help reduce the conflict that exists between 
Muslims and Buddhist government officials. 
The models presented in this thesis, which provide both short and long-term 
solutions, can be used as a general solution guideline which the Thai government can 
apply in real, practical terms. A solution strategy, however, will only prove to be truly 
effective if there is a genuine coordination effort between the Buddhist officials and the 
Muslim community.  Such cooperation and coordination will eliminate cultural and 
religious conflicts as well as mitigate the perceptions of inferiority, marginalization, 
inadequacy, and frustration that have created a violent barrier that exists between the Thai 
government and southern Thai Muslims. 
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